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EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
AND THE FUTURE OF CLASS-ACTION
WAIVERS
STACEY L. PINE
INTRODUCTION
Nearly a century ago, Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA)1 to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility that existed towards
arbitration agreements, and to encourage the use of arbitration as a means
of reducing the excessive costs and delays commonly associated with
litigation.2 As a result of the enactment of the FAA and numerous Supreme
Court cases interpreting the Act, this country has come to embrace a strong
federal policy which favors arbitration. This policy requires arbitration
agreements, including employment arbitration agreements, to be enforced
according to their terms in the same manner as other contracts.3
While numerous federal cases and Supreme Court opinions have
provided employers with guidance on the application of arbitration to a
myriad of employment issues, there is currently little case law that
addresses the enforcement of employment arbitration agreements which
prohibit class-action arbitration. The Supreme Court has issued three
opinions in the past three years in which it has held that the FAA preempts
state contract law and permits consumer contracts to prohibit class
arbitration, but the Court has yet to comment on the applicability of classaction arbitration waivers in the employment arena.4 In light of the
Supreme Court’s silence on this issue, the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) took it upon itself to determine the law in this area, and asserted in
1

See generally 9 U.S.C. §1 (1947).
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991); Brady v.
Williams Capital Group, L.P., 878 N.Y.S.2d 693, 698 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009)
(determining whether the specific arbitration provision is unenforceable as a matter of
public policy).
3
In re White Mountain Mining Co., 403 F.3d 164, 168 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing 9
U.S.C. § 201; Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1
(1985)); Volt Info. Srvs., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489
U.S. 468, 475-76 (1989) (arguing that there is a strong policy in favor of arbitration);
see also Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 682 (2010)
(using contractual rights and determining the expectations of the parties).
4
See generally CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012); AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v.
AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 599 U.S. 662 (2010).
2
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its administrative decision handed down in D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Cuda,5 that
an employer cannot prohibit class litigation of a claim while
simultaneously prohibiting class arbitration.6 The D.R. Horton decision
has led to disparate treatment of the issue in the federal courts and has left
employers wondering whether they should utilize class arbitration waivers.
Part I of this paper describes the evolution of the contract approach to the
enforcement of employment arbitration agreements through an analysis of
landmark cases that were instrumental in promoting this approach. Parts II
and III explore the controversy and confusion surrounding employment
class-action arbitration waivers and explain why the NLRB’s decision
constitutes an erroneous interpretation of the law which conflicts with
Supreme Court precedent as well as the Congressional intent that
arbitration agreements be enforced as contract. Finally, Part IV of this
paper analyzes what the D.R. Horton ruling means for employers and
discusses several ways employers may be able to utilize class arbitration
waivers despite the ruling. 7
PART I
JUDICIAL HOSTILITY TO FAVORABLE POLICY
A. The FAA Mandate to “Shake off” Judicial Hostility
Arbitration has been a means of private dispute resolution for thousands
of years, with some asserting that its use dates back to biblical times.8 In
the early 1900s, as our country became more commercialized, businesses
recognized the time and cost savings that could be achieved by resolving
commercial claims through arbitration rather than litigation. 9 As a result,
businesses increasingly began to use arbitration agreements in commercial
transactions as a required means of dispute resolution.10 While arbitration
5

357 N.L.R.B. 184 (2012).
Id. at 12.
7
Another issue relating to the D.R. Horton case concerns whether that decision was
properly issued without a quorum of three Board members as procedurally required by
New Process Steel v. NLRB. This topic, however, is outside the scope of this paper.
8
See e.g., CARRIE J. MENKEL-MEADOW, DISPUTE RESOLUTION BEYOND THE
ADVERSARIAL MODEL, at 383 (2nd ed. 2011) (“In the biblical story when two women
asked King Solomon to decide which of them could keep the baby, he acted not as an
officially appointed judge, deciding the matter according to predetermined rules and
procedures, but rather as an arbitrator to whom they voluntarily brought their
dispute.”).
9
See James E. Berger & Charlene Sun, The Evolution of Judicial Review Under the
Federal Arbitration Act, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 745, 748 (2009) (describing the
abandonment of hostility towards arbitration).
10
Id.
6
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agreements gained early popularity with businesses, they were largely
opposed by the judiciary.11 Judges were reluctant to enforce agreements
which required parties to abandon their statutory rights as well as their
rights to have disputes decided by a jury of their peers.12 For centuries, this
reluctance manifested itself as distrust and outright hostility as judges
expressly refused to enforce arbitration agreements.13 This hostility
stemmed from the belief that arbitration agreements were against public
policy. 14 It also originated, in part, from the long-standing opposition to
such agreements espoused by English judges who were unwilling “to
surrender their jurisdiction over various disputes” by enforcing arbitration
agreements.15 As this hostility became embedded in our judicial system,
courts increasingly declined to stray from the common law precedent and
refused to enforce arbitration agreements without a legislative mandate.16
Congress responded to the judiciary’s disdain for arbitration agreements
in 1925 by enacting the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).17 The FAA
provided the judiciary with a clear directive to “shake off the old judicial
hostility towards arbitration” and begin enforcing arbitration agreements as
legally viable contracts.18 Specifically, Section 2 of the FAA19 provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or
transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part
11

Jane Byeff Korn, Changing Our Perspective on Arbitration: A Traditional
Feminist View, 1991 U. ILL. REV. 67, 71 (1991) (dating back to the seventeenth
century).
12
See id. at 75 (“worrying about the lack of judicial instruction on the law”).
13
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 (1974) (citing H. R. Rep. No.
96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1, 2 (1924); see also S. Rep. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1924)); see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane, 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991) (giving the
purpose of the FAA); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-220
(1985) (“The House Report accompanying the [Federal Arbitration] Act makes clear
that its purpose was to … overrule the judiciary's longstanding refusal to enforce
agreements to arbitrate.”).
14
JON O. SHIMABUKURO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30934, FEDERAL
ARBITRATION ACT: BACKGROUND AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS (2003).
15
Id. at 2.
16
See Kulukundis Shipping v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 983-985 (1942)
(leading to the enactment of the FAA to fight this intransigence); Circuit City Stores,
Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 111 (2001).
17
Kulukundis Shipping, 126 F.2d at 985.
18
Id.
19
9 U.S.C. § 2 (1947).
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thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an
existing
controversy
arising
out
of
such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract.
This language has been held to constitute a clear Congressional
declaration favoring arbitration agreements. 20 More significantly, this
language requires arbitration agreements to be construed as contracts and
placed upon “the same footing” as other contracts.21 In other words, the
FAA affirms that the parties have the right to structure arbitration
agreements in ways that meet their specific needs, and requires the
enforcement of terms agreed upon by the parties. 22 The import of treating
arbitration agreements as contracts is that it requires the courts to stay or
dismiss judicial proceedings, and to compel arbitration where the parties
have a written arbitration agreement.23 It also means that arbitration
agreements may be invalidated only by generally applicable contract
defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.24
The FAA’s
command to treat arbitration agreements as contracts paved the way for the
use of such agreements to settle a wide-range of future disputes, including
employment disputes. 25

20

Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006).
Kulukundis Shipping v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978 at 985
(1942)(quoting H. R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1, 2 (1924) “the House
committee report [for the enactment of the FAA] stated, in part: ‘Arbitration
agreements are purely matters of contract, and the effect of the bill is simply to make
the contracting party live up to his agreement. He can no longer refuse to perform his
contract when it becomes disadvantageous to him. An arbitration agreement is placed
upon the same footing as other contracts, where it belongs.’”); Scherk v. AlbertoCulver Co., 417 U.S., 506, 510-11 (1974) (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st
Sess., 1, 2 (1924)); Arrants v. Buck, 130 F.3d 636, 640 (4th Cir. 1997).
22
Perry v.Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490 (1987) (finding under the FAA, “courts are
required to place arbitration agreements on equal footing with other contracts and
‘rigorously’ enforce them according to the terms agreed to by the parties.”); Volt Info.
Srvs., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479
(1989); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748-49 (2011).
23
See 9 USCS § 3 (1947) (mandating the arbitration clause be followed); Harris v.
Green Tree Financial Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 178-179 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating courts have
the right to compel arbitration). But see Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 975 F.2d
1161, 1164 (5th Cir. 1992) (courts may dismiss a case when all of the claims are
required to be submitted to arbitration).
24
AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1746 (quoting Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto,
517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)).
25
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 111 (2001) (“the FAA compels
judicial enforcement of a wide range of written arbitration agreements.”).
21
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B. Judicial Enforcement of Employment Arbitration Agreements
In the mid 1960s, Congress embarked on an aggressive expansion of the
rights and protections afforded employees through the enactment of laws
such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),26 the Age and
Discrimination Act of 1967 (ADEA)27, and the Occupational Safety and
Health Act (OSHA).28 Employers, faced with new statutes defining
minimum employment standards and expanding the rights of employees to
litigate employment claims, quickly realized that contractual arbitration
agreements could provide reprieve from the uncertainty and costs
associated with litigating such claims. Employers also realized that
arbitration clauses could minimize the power of unions, and began to insert
arbitration clauses into collective bargaining agreements (CBA). 29 There
existed, however, residual judicial hostility towards arbitration agreements
in the context of employment disputes, and the judiciary in Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver30 blatantly displayed this hostility by refusing to recognize
arbitration clauses as valid components of a CBA.31
In Alexander, a labor union and an employer negotiated a CBA which
specified that employees could only be terminated for proper cause; that the
employer could not discriminate against any employee; and that binding
arbitration would be used to resolve violations of the CBA.32 The plaintiffemployee was terminated for poor performance, but alleged that his
dismissal was racially motivated, i.e. discriminatory and therefore, in
breach of the contractual CBA agreement.33
The arbitrator ruled that the employer had demonstrated proper cause for
dismissal and, therefore, did not violate the contractual provisions of the
CBA. Subsequently, the EEOC determined there was no Title VII

26

See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964) (expanding employment protections on
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin).
27
See 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-24 (1967) (expanding rights on the basis of age).
28
See 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1967) (expanding rights to those injured on the job).
29
Gilmer v. Interstate Johnson/Lane, Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 29 (1991)(“Congress,
however, did not explicitly preclude arbitration or other nonjudicial resolution of
claims.”); See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 38 (1974); Barrentine v.
Arkansas Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 730-31 (1981).
30
Alexander, 415 U.S. at 59-60 (allowing an employee to pursue his title VII
remedy in federal court).
31
Id.
32
Id. at 39-40.
33
Id. at 39 (filing a grievance).
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violation.34 The employee, nonetheless, filed a Title VII suit in U.S.
District Court alleging racial discrimination. 35 The defendant-employer
argued that the employee was barred from litigating the action because he
had agreed to arbitration and a final arbitration decision had been reached.36
The Supreme Court found that the employee actually had two separate
claims, the CBA contractual claim and the Title VII claim.37 The Court
concluded that because the arbitration clause in the CBA did not specify
that employees’ statutory claims were subject to arbitration, the employee
had not waived his rights to litigate the Title VII claim in court. 38 The
Court further held that the employee had not waived his right to litigate
statutory claims because an employee’s individual rights to litigate such
claims could not be waived through a CBA negotiated by a third-party,
union representative.39
The question not answered by this decision was whether arbitration
clauses requiring the arbitration of statutory claims were valid if the
employee personally entered into the agreement with the employer.
In 1985, the Supreme Court took the first step towards clarifying the
validity of individual arbitration agreements encompassing statutory claims
in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., an
international commerce dispute involving claims under the Sherman AntiTrust Act. 40 In Mitsubishi, the Court held that agreements to arbitrate
statutory claims were valid, and “by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim,
a party does not forego the substantive rights afforded him by the statute;
the employee only submits to the resolution of claims in an arbitral, rather
than a judicial, forum.”41 The Court reinforced that arbitration agreements,
including those involving statutory claims, are instruments of contract by
declaring a “party should be held to an arbitration agreement unless
Congress has evidenced the intention to preclude a waiver of judicial

34

Id. at 42-43.
Id. at 43 (alleging a racially discriminatory employment practice).
36
See id. (the district court granted the employer’s motion for summary judgment
holding the employee was bound by the arbitral decision and thereby precluded from
suing his employer under Title VII).
37
See id. at 48 (using legislative history to show that there was intent to allow both
actions).
38
Id. at 49-50, 52.
39
See id. at 51 (holding that Title VII protects individuals and therefore is separate
from the CBA).
40
See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chryslery-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
628 (1985) (upholding a two-part test).
41
Id. at 628 (by submitting to arbitration, a party “trades the procedures and
opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition
of arbitration.”)
35
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remedies for the statutory rights at issue.” 42 Stated another way, the Court
surmised that if neither the plain statutory language nor legislative history
prohibits arbitration, then there is a strong presumption that Congress
intended arbitration to be permitted as a means of resolving disputes arising
under the statute.
The Mitsubishi holding was not limited to claims arising under the
Sherman Act which meant the Court could apply it to other statutory
disputes.43 Just a few years later, the Court did in fact look to Mitisubishi
as it addressed the arbitration of employment statutory claims in Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane, Corp.44 In this seminal case, the Court held that
employment agreements requiring arbitration to resolve statutory disputes,
where the agreement is entered into by the individual employee, are
enforceable.45
Interstate/Johnson Lane hired Gilmer as a Financial Services Manager,
but in order to work for the company, Gilmer was required to register with
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).46 As part of his NYSE
registration application Gilmer signed a contract agreeing to arbitrate any
dispute between him and Interstate/Johnson Lane arising out of his
employment with the company.47 Upon turning sixty-two, Gilmer was
terminated and brought suit in district court alleging age discrimination in
violation of the Age Discrimination Employment Act (ADEA).48 Gilmer
also asserted that compulsory arbitration of his claim was inconsistent with
the purposes of the statute.49 The Gilmer Court determined that neither the
plain language of the statute, nor its legislative history precluded
arbitration; and the agreement was, therefore, enforceable pursuant to the
FAA.50
Gilmer is a landmark decision, because it mandates the enforcement of
arbitration clauses requiring the arbitration of statutory employment claims.
Not unexpectedly, the Gilmer decision led to a significant increase in
private sector employment arbitration agreements. Following Gilmer, “the
percentage of employers in the private sector using employment arbitration
agreements increased from 3.6% in 1991 to 19% in 1997. By 1998, 62% of
42

Id.
See e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000).
44
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane, Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
45
Id. at 23.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 23, 27 (alleging a violation of the ADEA).
49
Id. at 27.
50
Id. at 26, 29.
43
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large corporations had used employment arbitration on at least one
occasion.”51
However, Gilmer’s contract was with a third-party, the NYSE, rather
than the employer, and the Gilmer holding did not address the validity of
arbitration agreements between the employer and the employee regarding
statutory claims. 52 Following Gilmer there was a lingering question
regarding whether the court would also find agreements entered into by the
employer/employee for the arbitration of statutory claims to be valid.
The Supreme Court answered that question in the affirmative in Circuit
City Stores, Inc., v. Adams.53 The employee, in Circuit City, entered into an
agreement with the employer which stated,
“I agree that I will settle any and all previously unasserted
claims, disputes or controversies arising out of or relating to my
application or candidacy for employment, employment and/or
cessation of employment with Circuit City, exclusively by final
and binding arbitration before a neutral Arbitrator. By way of
example only, such claims include claims under federal, state,
and local statutory or common law, such as the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, as amended, including the amendments of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the law
of contract and the law of tort.”54
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the FAA did not
apply to labor and employment contracts, specifically stating that “all
contracts of employment are beyond the FAA’s reach.”55 The Supreme
Court disagreed.56
The employee argued that Section 2 of the FAA was applicable only to
“transactions involving commerce” and because “transaction” as used in
Section 2 applies only to commercial contracts, an employment contract is
not a “contract evidencing a transaction involving interstate commerce.”57
The Supreme Court looked to Section 1 as well as Section 2 of the FAA in
making its decision.58 Section 1 of the FAA states, “nothing herein
51

Elizabeth Hill, AAA Employment Arbitration: A Fair Forum at Low Cost, DISP.
RESOL. J., May-July 2003, 9, at 10 (illustrating that the use of private employment
arbitration has risen).
52
See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane, Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991). .
53
Circuit City Stores, Inc., v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 110 (2001) (citing Craft v.
Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999)).
54
Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 110.
55
Id. at 109.
56
See id. at 119 (exempting only transportation workers).
57
Id. at 113.
58
See id. at 119.
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contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce.” 59 The Supreme Court explained that interpreting Section 2 to
apply only to commercial contracts would make the Section 1 exemption
provision “superfluous” because it would make all contracts beyond the
scope of the Act, and, in that case, there would have been no reason to
specify an exemption in Section 1 for seamen and railroad employees.60
Relying on the doctrine of ejusdem generis61 the Court also determined that
the words “any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce" in Section 1 of the FAA meant that the FAA was applicable to
all employment arbitration agreements except for those entered into by
transportation workers. 62 In arriving at this decision, the Court explained
that the FAA was constructed “broadly to overcome judicial hostility to
arbitration agreements” and that to exempt employment arbitration
agreements from enforceability would be counter to the intended purposes
of the statute.63 With this decision, the Supreme Court definitively
established that the FAA did place employment arbitration agreements on
the “same footing” as other contracts.64
Two other Supreme Court decisions played a significant role in defining
the scope of enforceability of employment arbitration agreements. First, in
Southland Corp. v. Keating,65 the Court ruled that the FAA applies to state
as well as federal courts.66 Thus, where there is a valid arbitration

59

9 U.S.C. § 1 (1947).
Circuit City Stores, Inc., v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 113 (2001).
61
Id. at 114-15 (“the statutory canon that ‘where words follow specific words in a
statutory enumeration, the general words are constructed to embrace only objects
similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words.’”).
62
Id. at 119; see also David R. Wade and Curtiss K. Behrens, Opening Pandora's
Box: Circuit City v. Adams and the Enforceability of Compulsory, Prospective
Arbitration Agreements, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 4 (2002).
63
Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 118-19.
Kulukundis Shipping v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F. 2d 978, 985 (1942) (quoting
H. R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1, 2 (1924)) (“The report of the House
committee [for the enactment of the FAA] stated, in part: ‘Arbitration agreements are
purely matters of contract, and the effect of the bill is simply to make the contracting
party live up to his agreement. He can no longer refuse to perform his contract when it
becomes disadvantageous to him. An arbitration agreement is placed upon the same
footing as other contracts, where it belongs.’”)
65
465 U.S. 1, (1984).
66
See id. at 12-13 (pointing to the legislative history to justify broadening the
scope).
60
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agreement, state anti-arbitration laws cannot preclude the application of the
FAA. 67
Finally, in 14 Penn Plaza, LLC., v. Pyett68 a divided 5-4 Supreme Court
held that “a CBA that clearly and unmistakably requires union members to
arbitrate ADEA claims is enforceable as a matter of federal law.”69 Penn
Plaza is distinguishable from the Court’s prior decision in Alexander
because the arbitration provision contained within the Penn Plaza CBA
“expressly covered both statutory and contractual discrimination claims,
whereas the Alexander agreement covered only contractual claims.”70
The Penn Plaza, decision was undoubtedly influenced by the precedent
established in pre-2009 cases, and expounded upon the principals set forth
in those cases.71 However, the Penn Plaza Court ultimately based its
decision on the exclusive representative authority afforded unions through
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).72 The Court reasoned that
because unions had a duty to bargain in good faith on behalf of employees,
and because employees could bring an action against the union for breach
of that duty, the employee’s rights were sufficiently protected.73 While the
Alexander Court held that that a union representative could not use a CBA
to waive an employee’s rights, the Penn Plaza Court strongly disagreed,
stating “nothing in the law suggests a distinction between the status of
arbitration agreements signed by an individual employee and those agreed
to by a union representative, and so long as a CBA clearly and
unmistakably sets forth the claims which will be arbitrated then an
agreement to arbitrate shall be enforced.”74
One obvious question left unanswered by Penn Plaza is what language is
required to meet the “clear and unmistakable” threshold. That issue was not
raised by the Penn Plaza employee in the lower court and, therefore, was
not addressed by the Supreme Court.75 Since Penn Plaza, federal courts
have held that the “clear and unmistakable” standard is met when an
arbitration agreement specifies that the employee agrees to waive his right
67

Id. at 12 (using the power to regulate commerce, Congress intended to apply the
FAA).
68
14 Penn Plaza, LLC., v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247(2009).
69
Id. at 274.
70
Id. at 249.
71
Id. at 258, 266 (citing Gilmer, the Court opined that the clear language of the
ADEA did not prohibit arbitration, and that had Congress’ intent been to provide such a
prohibition, then such a provision would appear in the statute; quoting Mitsubishi, the
Court further emphasized that “by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does
not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial forum.”)
72
See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1935).
73
See Penn Plaza, LLC., 556 U.S. at 271-72.
74
See id. at 258 (emphasis added).
75
Id. at 249.
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to litigate statutory claims; alerts the employee to this waiver; and specifies
which statutes are covered by the agreement.76 Further, if the employee is
given a choice to pursue his claim either through arbitration or litigation,
the agreement must specify that by pursuing the grievance through
arbitration, the employee is forfeiting his rights to litigate his statutory
claim.77
PART II
THE CONTROVERSY AND CONFUSION SURROUNDING CLASS-ACTION
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
In the wake of the aforementioned decisions, the number of employees
covered by employment arbitration plans administered by the American
Arbitration Association increased from 3 million employees in 1997 to 6
million in 2001.78 This is not a surprising statistic considering labor and
employment issues are the second most litigated topic in federal courts, and
the defense of such claims requires an exorbitant outlay of funds.79
Employers should be aware, however, that the previously discussed case
law does not mean that arbitration agreements are enforceable in every type
of employment dispute. For example, the authority granted to the National
Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” or “Board”), limits the enforceability of
an arbitration agreement for issues that fall under the Board’s purview.

76

See generally de Souza Silva v. Pioneer Janitorial Srvs., Inc., 777 F. Supp. 2d 198,
203-05 (D. Mass. 2011); Mathews v. Denver Newspaper Agency LLP, 649 F.3d 1199,
1205 (10th Cir. 2011); Shipkevich v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
51011 (E.D.N.Y. June 16, 2009)(CBA arbitration provision that did not state that
statutory anti-discrimination claims were subject to mandatory arbitration was held
unenforceable).
77
See de Souza Silva, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 203.
78
Elizabeth Hill, AAA Employment Arbitration: A Fair Forum at Low Cost, DISP.
RESOL. J., May-July 2003, at 2.
79
Fulbright Litigation Trends: Fulbrights 7th Annual Litigation Trends Survey
Report,
http://www.fulbright.com/images/publications/2010AnnualLitigationTrendsSurveyFin
dingsReport.pdf;
http://hrtests.blogspot.com/2007/04/cost-of-defendingemployment.html (last visited November 19, 2013)(As the number of suits has
increased, the cost for employers to defend an employment discrimination law suit has
reached significant levels: $10,000 if the suit is settled; $100,000 if it is resolved
through summary judgment or other pre-trial ruling; $175,000 if it goes to trial;
$250,000 if the trial is won by the plaintiff(s); $300,000 if the plaintiff’s victory
survives appeal).
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A. The NLRB’s Discretionary Authority Poses A Risk For Arbitration
Agreements
The NLRB is charged with enforcing the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA), which governs the private sector employer/employee relationship
and protects employees’ rights to organize a union, engage in collective
bargaining, and engage in other concerted activity for the purpose of
influencing wages or working conditions.80 The right to engage in
concerted activity is not confined to union activity, and the NLRA is
applicable to all non-union employees except supervisors, independent
contractors, railway and airline employees, and federal, state or local
government workers (U.S. Postal Service Employees are the only
government employees covered by the Act).81
Unlike the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which may or may not
elect to represent an employee in a dispute, the NLRB automatically
becomes an employee’s representative upon a finding that the employer
violated the NLRA.82 In such cases, the NLRB will attempt to facilitate a
settlement between the parties, and if these efforts fail, the matter then goes
before an Administrative Law Judge.83 Administrative rulings may be
appealed to the full Board and ultimately to the U.S. Courts of Appeal.84
Most significantly, the NLRB is not bound by arbitration agreements
entered into between the employer and employee, and it has unfettered
authority to determine whether it will recognize arbitration awards. This
authority is affirmed by the Supreme Court’s opinion in Carey v.
Westinghouse Electric Corp.85 There the Court interpreted Section 10(a) of
the NLRA to permit the NLRB to adjudicate claims for unfair labor
practices even if such claims are subject to an arbitration proceeding and
award.86 This discretionary authority poses substantial risk for employers
since an arbitration award in favor of the employer could be overturned by
80

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/75th/emp_rights.html
(last visited November 19, 2013).
81
NATIONAL
LABOR
RELATIONS
BOARD,
https://www.nlrb.gov/resources/faq/nlrb#t38n3182 (last visited November 19, 2013).
82
THE
EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/index.cfm (last visited November 19, 2013)(“We do not,
however, file lawsuits in all cases where we find discrimination.”); NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/what-we-do/investigate-charges (last visited
November 19, 2013).
83
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/what-wedo/investigate-charges (last visited November 19, 2013).
84
See id.
85
Carey v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 375 U.S. 261,271 (1964)(citing
International Harvester Co. v. NLRB, 138 NLRB 923 (1962)).
86
Id at 271.
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the NLRB, thereby subjecting the employer to liability and additional legal
expenses.
Additionally, there is limited jurisprudence regarding the enforceability
of employment arbitration agreements concerning issues governed by the
NLRA. In instances where case law exists, the Board is not required to
defer to federal court decisions, and can instead render decisions based on
Board precedent.87 This subjects employers to substantial risk for action by
the NLRB as the lack of judicial guidance in this area gives the Board
broad authority to determine whether it will enforce an employment
arbitration agreement under the NLRA.
B. A Consumer Arbitration Case Gives Employers Hope Regarding
Class-Action Waivers
As exhibited by the Gilmer decision, when courts are faced with a case
of first impression in the employment arena, they will likely seek guidance
from principles set forth in cases involving consumer arbitration
agreements.88 For this reason, the Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in AT&T
Mobility v. Concepcion89 provided employers with hope that employment
arbitration agreements could be structured to preclude class arbitration.
The contract at issue in AT&T required consumers to arbitrate their
claims on an individual basis, thereby precluding class litigation as well as
class arbitration.90 The dispute arose when AT&T advertised free phones
with the purchase of an AT&T service contract and then billed the
plaintiffs, the Concepcions, $30.22, representative of the sales tax based on
the phone’s retail value. 91 The Concepcions and other consumers brought
a class action suit alleging deceptive trade practices, and AT&T moved to
compel arbitration under the terms of the service contract.92 The Ninth
Circuit held that the arbitration provision was unconscionable pursuant to

87
Daniel P. O’Gorman, CONSTRUING THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT: THE
NLRB AND METHODS OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, 81 Temp. L. Rev. 177, 190
(2008).
88
Gilmer v. Interstate Johnson/Lane, Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 29 (1991); See also
LaVoice v. UBS Fin. Servs., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5277 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13,
2012)(citing AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, the Court held that requiring the
arbitration of a Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) claim on an individual basis does not
conflict with the FLSA’s collective action provisions).
89
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1752 (U.S. 2011).
90
Id. at 1744.
91
Id.
92
Id. at 1744-45.
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California’s Discover Bank rule, and not pre-empted by the FAA. 93 The
Circuit Court reasoned that because the final phrase of Section 2 of the
FAA permits arbitration agreements to be declared unenforceable “upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract,”
and California law permits the revocation of a contract for
unconscionability, the dispute was governed by state law.94 Finding that
California’s Discover Bank rule rendered class-action waivers in arbitration
agreements unconscionable, the Court held the AT&T agreement
unconscionable and, therefore, unenforceable.95
The Supreme Court declined to uphold the Ninth Circuit’s decision. 96
Instead, the Supreme Court found the California law to be an “obstacle” to
the Congressional objectives of the FAA and held that the FAA pre-empts
any state contract law that stands as an obstacle to the FAA’s purpose.97 In
reaching this conclusion, the Court relied upon case law affirming that “the
principal purpose of the FAA is to ensure that private arbitration
agreements are enforced according to their terms.”98 The Court explained
that the number of parties involved and the added procedural requirements
placed on the arbitrator relative to class certification, would hinder the
arbitration process by eliminating the advantages which include
informality, speed, and lower cost.99 The Court further opined that class
arbitration would be more likely to “generate procedural morass rather than
final judgment.”100
C. NLRB Decision Invalidates Class-Action Arbitration Waivers
Many employers and labor attorneys celebrated the AT&T decision,
believing the open language of the decision provided the necessary
guidance for the prohibition of class arbitration in the employment setting
much like Mitsubishi paved the way for the arbitration of employment
statutory claims.101 That celebration abruptly ended three months after it

93

Id. at 1745.
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 1753 (“a federal statute’s saving clause cannot in reason be construed as
[allowing] a common law right, the continued existence of which would be absolutely
inconsistent with the provisions of the act.”) Id. at 1748.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 1753 (citing Volt Info. Srvs., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford
Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989); see also Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l
Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010)).
99
AT&T Mobility 131 S. Ct. at 1750-51.
100
Id. at 1751.
101
Daniel Schwartz, The Quickly Shifting Landscape of Class Actions and
Arbitrations, Connecticut Employment Law Blog (November 21, 2013, 11:05 am),
94
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began when the NLRB exercised its broad administrative authority in D.R.
Horton, and ruled that an employer could not use employment contracts to
prohibit class litigation while simultaneously prohibiting class
arbitration.102
In January 2006, D.R. Horton implemented a corporate-wide policy
requiring all new and current employees to sign a Mutual Arbitration
Agreement (MAA) as a condition of employment.103 The MAA stipulated
1) that binding arbitration would be the exclusive means of dispute
resolution, thereby preventing employees from bringing class action
litigation; 2) the employees were prohibited from arbitrating their claims as
a class; and 3) by signing the agreement employees waived their right to
file a law suit or civil proceeding as well as the right to resolve the dispute
before a judge or jury, thereby prohibiting employees from having cases
heard by any judge, including an Administrative Law Judge.104 In 2008,
Cuda and other superintendents notified D.R. Horton of their intent to
initiate class-action arbitration, alleging that Horton violated the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) by misclassifying them as exempt employees and
denying them overtime pay.105 When D.R. Horton refused to submit to
class-action arbitration, asserting that the MAA barred arbitration of
collective claims, Cuda filed an unfair labor practice charge with the
NLRB. NLRB efforts to resolve the claim failed, and the NLRB filed an
Administrative Law complaint against the employer alleging unfair labor
practice under Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA.106
D.R. Horton and NLRB’s General Counsel both appealed the
Administrative Law Judge’s decision to the full Board, which ultimately
ruled that D.R. Horton had engaged in unfair labor practices. 107 In arriving
at this decision, the Board determined the issue before it was not whether
an NLRA claim could be arbitrated, but rather “whether the MAA’s
categorical prohibition of joint, class, or collective employment law claims
in any forum directly violated the substantive rights vested in employees by
Section 7 of the NLRA.”108 The Board predicated its decision on three legal
conclusions.109 First, the Board observed that sections 1 and 6 of the MAA
http://www.ctemploymentlawblog.com/2011/05/articles/the-quickly-shiftinglandscape-of-class-actions-and-arbtirations/.
102
See generally, D. R. Horton, 2012 NLRB LEXIS 11 (2012).
103
D. R. Horton, at 1.
104
Id.
105
29 U.S.C. § 213; D. R. Horton, at 1.
106
D. R. Horton, at 1.
107
See id. at 2.
108
See id. at 1.
109
Id. at 5, 17, and 47.
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collectively stated that “all disputes would be determined by binding
arbitration and the employee was waiving his right to file a law suit or
other civil proceeding or have it heard before any judge or jury.”110 The
Board concurred with the Administrative Law Judge that this language
would reasonably lead employees to believe they were prohibited from
filing charges against their employer with the NLRB or other federal
agencies, which violates the NLRA.111 The Board held that employers may
not keep employees in the dark about their rights and are obligated to
communicate to employees that by signing the arbitration agreement the
employees retains their rights to file charges with the NLRB, EEOC, or
other applicable agencies.112
Next, the Board surmised that the right to engage in concerted activity
under Section 7 is a substantive right, central to the NLRA’s purpose, and
is not merely a procedural right.113 The Board reasoned that because it is a
substantive right, it cannot be contractually waived and employees cannot
be forced to individually bargain for aid or protection.114 The Board noted
the existence of a strong NLRB precedent holding that contracts restricting
Section 7 rights are unlawful.115 It refused to deviate from that precedent,
holding the MAA constituted an unfair labor practice under Section 8(a)(1)
because it prevented employees from collectively arbitrating or litigating a
claim which is a direct violation of Section 7 of the NLRA.116
Finally, the board boldly asserted that the FAA did not govern this case,
and in the alternative, if it did govern, it was not applicable.117 The Board
held the Norris-LaGuardia Act was the controlling law rather than the FAA
since the Norris-LaGuardia Act was enacted seven years after the FAA and
invalidates any agreement between the employer and the employee which
requires the employee to waive his rights to collective action.118 The Board
argued that the later enacted Norris-LaGuardia Act implicitly repealed
conflicting provisions of the earlier FAA.119
110

Id. at 3, 5.
Id. at 2.
112
D. R. Horton, at 1 at 17.
113
See id. at 2.
114
Id. at 17, 19.
115
Id. at 17.
116
Id. at 1, 6.
117
D. R. Horton, at 1 at 8..
118
29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1982); D.R. Horton at *12 (“Congress determined that
workers should have full freedom of association and shall be from from the
interference, restraint, or coercion of employers in concerted activity for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”)
119
Id. at 12 (citing Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 154 (1976);
Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 402 U.S. 570, 582 fn. 18 (1971);
Posadas v. Nat’l City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503(1936); see also Tug Allie-B, Inc. v.
United States, 273 F.3d 936, 948(11th Cir. 2001)).
111
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The Board further reasoned that the FAA was not applicable to this case
because arbitration agreements are enforceable under the FAA only where
the agreement does not require a party to forgo substantive rights afforded
by the statute. 120 Because the MAA required employees to abandon the
substantive right to engage in concerted activity, the FAA did not apply.121
Seminal cases interpreting the application of the FAA to class arbitration
presented a troubling issue for the Board. It devoted a considerable portion
of its decision to explaining the ways in which D.R. Horton was
distinguished from judicial precedents. Regarding the AT&T case, for
example, the Board noted that AT&T involved a state pre-emption claim,
governed by the Supremacy Clause where the D.R. Horton case involved
two federal statutes.122 The Board stressed that its ruling provided an
appropriate accommodation of the policies underlying the two federal
statutes.123 The Board further defended by asserting that a critical factor
leading to the AT&T decision was the determination that requiring class
arbitration would “sacrifice the principal advantages” of arbitration, namely
informality and streamlined proceedings.124 The Board reasoned that the
D.R. Horton case differed from AT&T because the disputes covered by the
AT&T consumer agreements could involve “tens of thousands of potential
claimants,” but employment class actions typically only involved twenty
employees, thereby, making employment class arbitration more
manageable and less time consuming than consumer arbitration.125
The Board similarly dismissed the Penn Plaza decision, reasoning that
an arbitration clause in a CBA does not stand on the same footing as an
MAA imposed on an individual employee as a condition of employment.
126
The Board opined that when employees engage in the collective
bargaining process through a union representative, the employee is
engaging in concerted activity. 127 For this reason, in instances where the

120
D.R. Horton at 9 (citing Gilmer v. Interstate Johnson/Lane, Corp., 500 U.S. 20,
29 (1991); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chryslery-Plymouth, Inc. 473 U.S. 614
(1985)).
121
Id.
122
U.S. CONST. ART. VI §2; D.R. Horton. at 50.
123
Id. at 34.
124
Id. at 11 (citing AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 (U.S.
2011)).
125
Id. (citing AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1752 (U.S.
2011)).
126
Id. at 10.
127
Id.
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CBA waives employees’ rights, there is no infringement of Section 7
rights.128
PART III
THE NLRB’S QUESTIONABLE INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW
Federal Courts Disagree About the Applicability of D.R. Horton
So far, the District Courts that have addressed employment class-action
waivers since the NLRB rendered its decision have not agreed on whether
the D.R. Horton decision controls.129 For instance, ten days after the
NLRB handed down its decision, the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York explicitly refused to rely on the D.R. Horton decision
in deciding LaVoice v. UBS Financial Services, a case which, like D.R.
Horton, involved a claim under the FLSA.130 Instead, the court treated
AT&T as the controlling authority, noting that AT&T made clear that an
absolute right to collective action is inconsistent with the FAA’s purpose of
enforcing arbitration agreements according to their terms.131 Conversely,
two months later, the District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin
held in Herrington v. Waterstone Mortgage Corp., another FLSA case, that
the D.R. Horton ruling made the class-action waiver at issue
unenforceable.132
A.NLRB Decision Seemingly Conflicts With Supreme Court Precedent

128

Id.
See Palmer v. Convergys Corp., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16200 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 9,
2012) (holding that a class-action waiver pertained to procedural rather than
substantive rights and dismissing D. R. Horton as not meaningful to the assessment);
Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 768 F. Supp. 2d 547 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (refusing to
follow AT&T Mobility and enforce the class waiver because the employee was unable
to vindicate her rights on an individual basis); Sanders v. Swift Transp. Co. of Ariz.,
LLC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24234 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2012)(Court granted
employer’s motion to compel the arbitration of individual claims in a putative class
action. Plaintiff argued the class-action waiver was invalid under D.R. Horton, but the
Court held D.R. Horton was not pertinent and refused to follow it); Johnmohammadi v.
Bloomingdale's Inc., No. 11-cv-06434 (GW)(AJW) (C.D. Cal. Feb. 29,
2012)(unpublished decision. District Court enforced the employee’s waiver of his
rights to class action arbitration or litigation of his claim).
130
LaVoice v. UBS Fin. Servs., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5277 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13,
2012).
131
Id. at 19-20.
132
Herrington v. Waterstone Mortg. Corp., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36220, at 18
(W.D. Wis. Mar. 16, 2012) (basing decision on D.R. Horton).
129
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Two of the three legal conclusions on which the NLRB based its
decision conflict with Supreme Court precedent, and are likely to be
rejected if the Supreme Court considers the D.R. Horton case.
First, the Board erroneously concluded that the Norris-LaGuardia Act
governs this dispute because it was enacted seven years after the FAA, and
the statute’s language implicitly repeals conflicting sections of the FAA.133
The Norris-LaGuardia Act prevents an employer from hindering an
employee’s ability to join in concerted activity for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, but does not expressly state
that its provisions supersede conflicting provisions in the FAA. 134 The
Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned that it strongly disfavors “repeals
by implication.”135 “In the absence of some affirmative showing of
intention to repeal, the only permissible justification for a repeal by
implication is when the earlier and later statutes are irreconcilable” and the
later statute covers the whole subject of the earlier one, and is clearly
intended as a substitute.136 Clearly, the FAA is not irreconcilable with the
Norris-LaGuardia Act as the Norris-LaGuardia Act encourages use of
non-judicial processes of negotiation, mediation and arbitration for the
resolution of labor disputes.137 Moreover, the primary purpose of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act was to foster growth and vitality of labor unions,
evidencing that it was not intended to be a substitute for the FAA which
was enacted to ensure that arbitration agreements are “on the same footing”
as other contracts.138 Additionally, since the Norris LaGuardia Act did not
express a clear Congressional intent to repeal all or part of the FAA, the
Supreme Court will likely reject the Board’s argument that the NorrisLaGuardia Act supplants the FAA.139
Next, the Board concluded that the right to engage in concerted activity
under Section 7 is a substantive right, not merely a procedural right, and
that substantive rights cannot be contractually waived. 140 The Board
133

D. R. Horton, 2012 NLRB LEXIS 11, 12 (2012).
29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115
135
Id. (citing Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 154 (1976);
Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 402 U.S. 570, 582 fn. 18 (1971);
Posadas v. Nat’l City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503(1936); see also Tug Allie-B, Inc. v.
United States, 273 F.3d 936, 948(11th Cir. 2001); United States v. United Continental
Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164, 168 (“it is a cardinal principle of statutory construction that
repeals by implication are not favored.”).
136
Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 504-05 (1936); Morton v. Mancari,
417 U.S. 535, 550 (1974).
137
Brotherhood of R. Trainmen v Toledo, P. & W. Railroad, 321 US 50 (1942).
138
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991)
139
Boys Markets, Inc. v Retail Clerks Union, 398 US 235 (1970).
140
D. R. Horton, 2012 NLRB LEXIS 11, *6 (2012).
134
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contended the NLRA prohibited Cuda from being denied the right to
engage in concerted activity provided to him through the FLSA.141 This
conclusion is also defective and contradicts case law. First, specific to the
FLSA, various courts have held that the right to engage in collective
activity is not a substantive right within the FLSA. 142 More generally
courts have established that the right to proceed as a class is merely a
procedural mechanism that can be waived through an arbitration agreement
because there is no substantive right to collectively address grievances.143
The Board further contended that requiring individual arbitration equates
to a waiver of a substantive right and such rights cannot be contractually
waived.144 First, Gilmer makes clear that “[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a
statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the
statute; it only submits to resolution in an arbitral, rather a judicial
forum.”145 The Gilmer Court maintained that an arbitration agreement that
prohibits class-wide relief is not necessarily invalid in cases brought under
a statute which includes a collective action provision.146 Further, because
of the contract principles surrounding arbitration agreements, such
agreements must be enforced “even if the arbitration could not go forward
as a class-action or class relief could not be granted by the arbitrator.”147
141

See generally D. R. Horton.
Herrington v. Waterstone Mortg. Corp., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36220 (W.D.
Wis. Mar. 16, 2012) (citing Carter v. Countrywide Credit Industries, Inc., 362 F.3d
294, 298 (5th Cir. 2004) ("[W]e reject the Carter Appellants' claim that their inability to
proceed collectively deprives them of substantive rights available under the FLSA.");
Horenstein v. Mortgage Market, Inc., 9 Fed. Appx. 618, 619 (9th Cir. 2001)
("Appellants' contention that the arbitration clause in the Employment Agreements may
not be enforced because it eliminates their statutory right to a collective action, is
insufficient to render an arbitration clause unenforceable."); Copello v. Boehringer
Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals Inc., 812 F. Supp. 2d 886, 894 (N.D. Ill. 2011) ("Courts
routinely hold that FLSA does not grant employees the unwaivable right to proceed in
court collectively under § 216(b) . . . [W]hile FLSA prohibits substantive wage and
hour rights from being contractually waived, it does not prohibit contractually waiving
the procedural right to join a collective action.").
143
Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 54 (1st Cir. 2006)(class-action (including
class arbitration) is a procedure for redressing claims); Blas v. Belfer, 368 F.3d 501,
505 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding “there is no substantive right to a class remedy; a class
action is a procedural device.”); Johnson v. West Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366 (3rd
Cir. 2000) (holding that the right to collectively assert a claim for the violation of a
federal statute can be waived through an arbitration agreement since it is merely a
procedural right); See also Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
130 S. Ct. 1431, 1443 (opining that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, the federal rule
authorizing class actions, affects only procedural rights, while “it leaves the parties’
legal rights intact.”).
144
See generally D. R. Horton, 2012 NLRB LEXIS 11, *6, 15-21 (2012).
145
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane, Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 (1991).
146
Id. at 33.
147
Id.
142
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The Board’s assertion also conflicts with the Supreme Court’s decision
in 14 Penn Plaza, LLC v. Pyett in which the Court held that a union could,
in a CBA, contractually waive employees’ Section 7 rights in exchange for
employer concessions.148 D.R. Horton did not involve a CBA, and the
MAA was unilaterally imposed on employees as a condition of
employment.149 The Board stated that “an arbitration clause freely and
collectively bargained between a union and an employer does not stand on
the same footing as an employment policy, such as the MAA, imposed on
individual employees by the employer as a condition of employment.”150
Thus, while the Supreme Court’s interpretation permits a third-party to
contractually waive an employee’s Section 7 rights, the NLRB’s
interpretation prohibits the employee from contractually waiving his own
right to engage in concerted activity through an arbitration agreement.
The Board next asserted that the FAA was not applicable to this case
because arbitration is applicable under the FAA only where the arbitration
agreement does not require a party to forego substantive rights afforded by
the statute.151 Since the right to collective activity is not a substantive right
this argument fails, thereby, making the FAA applicable to the D.R. Horton
dispute and requiring the contractual enforcement of the arbitration
agreement.152

148

14 Penn Plaza, LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 259-60 (2009) ([T]here is no basis for
the Court to strike down the arbitration clause in this CBA, which was freely negotiated
by the Union . . ., and which clearly and unmistakably requires respondents to arbitrate
the age-discrimination claims at issue in this appeal. Congress has chosen to allow
arbitration of ADEA claims. The Judiciary must respect that choice.”).
149
D. R. Horton, 2012 NLRB LEXIS 11, at *3 (describing the agreement that
required all employees “to agree, as a condition of employment, that they will not
pursue class or collective litigation of claims in any forum, arbitral or judicial”).
150
Id. at *45.
151
Id. at *38 (citing Gilmer v. Interstate Johnson/Lane, Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26
(1991)).
152
See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745-46 (2011)
(emphasizing that arbitration is a matter of contract and that courts must place
arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts); Volt Info. Srvs., Inc.
v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989) (affirming the
lower court’s proposition that “the federal policy is simply to ensure the enforceability,
according to their terms, of private agreements to arbitrate”); Perry v. Thomas, 482
U.S. 483, 490 (1987) (noting that the general applicability of the FAA reflects that
“‘[t]he preeminent concern of Congress in passing the Act was to enforce private
agreements into which parties had entered . . . .’”) (citing Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v.
Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)).
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B. The D.R. Horton Decision Contradicts Supreme Court Cases
Regarding Class Arbitration
Finally, the Board’s decision contradicts the three most recent Supreme
Court cases barring class arbitration in consumer cases and ignores the
reasoning that led to those decisions. For instance, in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v.
AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., the Supreme Court held that when an arbitration
agreement is silent on the matter of class arbitration, it is presumed that the
parties did not agree to use class arbitration and, therefore, that neither
party can be compelled to submit to class arbitration to resolve the claim.
153
The Court reached this decision based on the FAA principal that
arbitration is a matter of contract and consent.154 The D.R. Horton decision
makes it clear that if an employee wishes to engage in concerted activity,
the employer cannot prevent the employee from doing so.155 Under the
D.R. Horton decision, if an arbitration agreement prohibits class litigation
but is silent on class arbitration, and an employee wants to engage in class
arbitration as a means of resolving his dispute, the employer has no choice
but to submit to the employee’s demand, lest he be found by the Board to
have engaged in unfair labor practices. This is in direct conflict with the
Stolt-Nielsen decision, which requires parties to consent to the terms.
Although Stolt-Nielsen was a consumer case, the contract principle of
consensual terms upon which the decision is based applies to all arbitration
agreements.156 The Board, however, refused to give weight to Stolt-Nielsen
saying it was not applicable to employment cases since it involved a
consumer dispute.157
Similarly, the Board refused to apply AT&T to the D.R. Horton case
because it too was a consumer, rather than employment, dispute.158 In
arriving at its decision, the AT&T Court reasoned that “[r]equiring the
availability of class wide arbitration interferes with fundamental attributes
of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA.”159 The
Court maintained that class arbitration would eviscerate the benefits of
arbitration as more participants would require more formality for the sake
of keeping order, confidentiality would be impossible to achieve, and a
153

Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775 (U.S. 2010)
(reasoning that “a party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class
arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do
so”).
154
Id.
155
See generally D. R. Horton, 2012 NLRB LEXIS 11, at *6 (2012).
156
D. R. Horton, 2012 NLRB LEXIS 11, at *54.
157
Id (noting that Stolt-Nielsen is not controlling because it did not “involve[ ] the
waiver of rights protected by the NLRA or even employment agreements”).
158
Id.
159
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011).
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large number of plaintiffs would inevitably slow down the pace of
resolution while adding to the procedural complexity, and the cost to all
parties.160 This is sound reasoning regardless of whether the dispute
involves 10,000 consumers or 100 employees.
Should D.R. Horton be heard by the Supreme Court, the Court will likely
also look to CompuCredit v. Greenwood for guidance. In Compucredit,
credit card holders signed an agreement agreeing to arbitrate all claims, but
subsequently filed a class action suit against the credit card company
alleging violations of the Credit Repair Organizations Act (CROA).161 As
required by the CROA, the agreement contained the statement, “You have
a right to sue a credit repair organization that violates the [CROA]” and any
waiver by any consumer of any protection provided by the Act is void.162
The consumers asserted that the statute gave them the right to litigate their
claim, and also prohibited the waiver of that right, making the arbitration
agreement unenforceable.163
The Court held that the only consumer rights provided by the CROA
were the rights to be alerted to the fact they could file an action in a court
of law, and also alerted to the protections provided elsewhere in the
statute.164 The Court further held that arbitration agreements are to be
enforced in accordance with their terms unless the statute manifests a clear
Congressional intent to preclude arbitration as a means of resolving
claims.165
The Court concluded that the language of the CROA providing for a
"right-to-sue" and maintenance of class actions did not demonstrate a
Congressional intent to nullify the FAA policy favoring arbitration.166 In
other words, notwithstanding a notice about the right to sue, consumers
could contractually waive their right to sue through an arbitration
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Id. at 1749-52.
CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 668 (2012).
162
Id. at 669.
163
Id.
164
Id. at 669-70 (“The only consumer right it creates is the right to receive the
statement, which is meant to describe the consumer protections that the law elsewhere
provides. The statement informs consumers, for instance, that they can dispute the
accuracy of information in their credit file and that “‘[t]he credit bureau must then
reinvestigate and modify or remove inaccurate or incomplete information.’”).
165
Id. at 672-673 (suggesting that “[h]ad Congress meant to prohibit these very
common provisions in the CROA, it would have done so in a manner less obtuse than
what respondents suggest,” and holding that “[b]ecause the CROA is silent on whether
claims under the Act can proceed in an arbitrable forum, the FAA requires the
arbitration agreement to be enforced according to its terms”).
166
CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 672 (2012).
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agreement.167 Similarly, although the language of the NLRA gives
employees the right to engage in concerted activities, it does not express
clear Congressional intent to thwart an employee’s ability to contractually
waive that right.
The Board’s rejection of these cases indicates the Board will not defer to
Supreme Court decisions upholding the enforcement of class-action
waivers in consumer cases despite the fact that AT&T, Stolt-Nielsen, and
Compucredit exemplify the Supreme Court’s deference to class arbitration
waivers. Because the Board’s interpretation of the law is contrary to the
principles the Supreme Court set forth in these cases, the Supreme Court
seemingly has ample reason to reject the D.R. Horton ruling.
PART IV

What Does The D.R. Horton Ruling Mean For Employers?
The D.R. Horton Decision is Limited in Scope
The NLRB is likely to follow D.R. Horton absent a contrary ruling by
the U.S. Supreme Court or the election of a new Administration and
subsequent replacement of Board members. The peril to employers is that
while employers can appeal decisions of the NLRB to the federal courts,
there is significant cost associated with doing so and the contradictory
decisions that currently exist create much uncertainty relative to outcome.
Additionally, this ruling puts employers who currently have agreements
that prohibit class litigation and arbitration at considerable risk for charges
of unfair labor practices by the NLRB as employees and unions will
inevitably begin to challenge such agreements.
Employers can find some solace, however, in knowing that the D.R.
Horton decision is limited in scope.168 For instance, the decision is only
applicable to private-sector, union and non-union, employees covered by
the NLRA.
This means that employers may require supervisors,
independent contractors, railway and airline employees, and federal, state
or local government workers (with the exception of U.S. postal workers) to
resolve all disputes through individual arbitration, including class-action
arbitration. The NLRA is not applicable to these employees and, therefore
employers are, not required to afford them opportunities for collective
activity.169
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Id.
See generally JON O. SHIMABUKURO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30934,
FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT: BACKGROUND AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS (2003).
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Frequently Asked Questions, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
https://www.nlrb.gov/resources/faq/nlrb/which-employees-are-protected-under-nlra
(last visited January 22, 2014).
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Additionally, the decision does not mandate that employees resolve
class-action disputes only through litigation.170 Key to the D.R. Horton
decision was the fact that the MAA prohibited both class-action litigation
and class-action arbitration.171 The Board noted in dicta that the NLRA
permits collective arbitration and observed that Supreme Court decisions
have held that the pursuit of grievances through collective arbitration is
concerted activity within the bounds of Section 7.172 Therefore, employers
can require all disputes to be resolved through arbitration, so long as the
right to collective arbitration is not foreclosed.173 If employers utilize an
agreement requiring arbitration, including class arbitration, they must
ensure that the agreement clearly advises employees of the employees’
rights to file charges with the NLRB or other applicable agencies.174
A.Potential Opportunity For Limited Use of Class-Action Waivers
The D.R. Horton decision did not address whether allowing subgroups of
the class to collectively arbitrate their claims would be permissible. This
could be an area of opportunity for employers who wish to require
arbitration, but want to limit the number of claims arbitrated at one time.
Section 7 of the NLRA grants employees the right to “engage in concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection,” and this includes efforts to “improve terms and conditions or
otherwise improve their lot as employees.”175 The right to engage in
concerted activities includes those instances in which the employee
presents demands to the employer as a group in order to improve working

170
D. R. Horton, 2012 NLRB LEXIS 11, at *6, 52 (2012) (holding that “an
employer violates the NLRA by requiring employees, as a condition of employment, to
waive their right to pursue collective legal redress in both judicial and arbitral
forums”).
171
See generally id.
172
Id. at *9 (“When the grievance is pursued under a collectively-bargained
grievance-arbitration procedure, the Supreme Court has observed, ‘No one doubts that
the processing of a grievance in such a manner is concerted activity within the meaning
of § 7.”) (citing NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 836 (1984)).
173
Id. at *10 (“Thus, employees who join together to bring employment-related
claims on a classwide or collective basis in court or before an arbitrator are exercising
rights protected by Section 7 of the NLRA’”).
174
Id. at *55 (holding that “an agreement requiring arbitration of any individual
employment-related claims, but not precluding a judicial forum for class or collective
claims, would not violate the NLRA, because it would not bar concerted activity”).
175
Id. at *6.
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conditions. 176 Arguably, an employment arbitration agreement that allows
employees to collectively arbitrate a claim, but restricts the number of
employees who can join together for a single arbitration, while allowing the
employee to self-select the employees with whom he will join, would meet
this criterion. For instance, if one-hundred employees who are governed by
an arbitration agreement institute a class action against the employer, and
are allowed to arbitrate in groups of twenty, and self-select their group, the
arbitration agreement should arguably be enforced.
The reasons for this are three-fold. First, the decision in D.R. Horton,
relied on the fact that employees were completely denied an opportunity to
jointly arbitrate claims in any forum.177 Relying on Gilmer, the Board
reasoned that arbitration was permissive so long as it did not require a party
to forgo substantive rights afforded by the NLRA, namely the substantive
right of collective activity.178 It is well established that “arbitration may
substitute for a judicial forum so long as the litigant can effectively
vindicate his or her statutory rights through arbitration.”179 Assuming the
right to engage in concerted activity is a substantive right, this scenario
does not cause the employee to lose that substantive right since the
employee could collectively advocate for mutual aid and protection with a
group of his or her peers rather than individually. Pursuant to NLRB
precedent, for an activity to be “concerted activity” it must include multiple
employees and not just one employee acting on his own behalf.180 Neither
case law nor the language of the NLRA prohibits subdividing the class.181
The law simply says that you must be free to join together for collective
action. So long as the statute does not stipulate that the class must proceed
as one unit, the scenario does not foreclose the employees’ rights to
collectively proceed.
Where a conflict exists between two federal statutes, the Board is
required to resolve the contract in a manner that maintains the integrity of
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29 U.S.C.A. § 157; see, e.g., citing Distributive Workers of America v. NLRB,
593 F.2d 1155, 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding that Section 7 rights “extend beyond
formal union activities and include concerted activities of the type engaged in here,
where the employees found it necessary to present their demands as a group in order to
secure relief from intolerable working conditions”).
177
D. R. Horton, 2012 NLRB LEXIS 11, at *6, 15 (2012) (reasoning that “the MAA
requires employees, as a condition of their employment, to refrain from bringing
collective or class claims in any forum”).
178
Id. at *38.
179
Id.
180
Id. at *13-14 (noting that for conduct by a single employee to constitute
concerted activity, he or she must be seeking to initiate, induce, or prepare for group
action).
181
Id. at *14.
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both statutes to the greatest extent possible.182 Neither the FAA nor the
NLRA explicitly sanction or prohibit class-action arbitration agreements.183
The conflict arises because the FAA purports a liberal policy favoring
arbitration which requires arbitration agreements to be honored as
contracts, while the NLRA requires employees to be given the right to
collectively resolve claims.184 According to the NLRB, you cannot
contractually waive this substantive right.185 The small group proposal
would honor the contract adopted by both parties while allowing the
resolution of the claim through concerted activity. Further, since the
employee’s ability to collectively engage in arbitration would not be
restrained, small group arbitration would not constitute an unfair labor
practice under Section 8(a)(1).186
Finally, the judicially affirmed benefits of arbitration cannot be
discounted: less procedural rigor, lower costs, greater efficiency and speed,
confidentiality, and the ability to utilize expert adjudicators to resolve
specialized disputes.187 Large class arbitrations impede the realization of
these benefits as envisioned by the FAA.188 Such benefits would be
preserved, however, by allowing the class to subdivide into smaller groups
for the arbitration of their claims.
There are, of course, some potential downsides to this proposal which
should be considered by employers. First, arbitrating a claim in front of
multiple arbitrators could actually increase the employer’s legal costs.
Additionally, many federal employment statutes allow employees to
recover attorney fees, thus, subjecting employers to the risk of multiple fees
for several small groups of employees rather than a single fee for a large
class of employees. Further, by subdividing the class, the employer could
182

Id. at *34 (citing S. S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 47 (1942); Direct Press
Modern Litho, 328 NLRB 860, 861 (1999); Image Sys., 285 NLRB 370, 371 (1987)).
183
9 U.S.C.A. §§ 2, 9; see Discover Bank v. Superior Ct., 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal.
2005) (stating that “under both federal and California law, arbitration agreements are
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract”).
184
9 U.S.C.A. §2; 29 U.S.C. § 157.
185
D. R. Horton, 2012 NLRB LEXIS 11, at *6, 17 (2012) (affirming that “employerimposed, individual agreements that purport to restrict Section 7 rights – including,
notably, agreements that employees will pursue claims against their employer only
individually,” are unlawful under the Board’s precedent).
186
Id. at *15-16 (“Section 8(a)(1) of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice for an
employer ‘to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in’ Section 7.”).
187
See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775
(2010).
188
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1751-53 (2011).
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be exposed to inconsistent outcomes relative to the various subgroups as
decisions would be rendered by different arbitrators and would be based on
facts specific to the subgroups.
Employers may also be able to use class-waivers by showing the waivers
were voluntary. The fact that D.R. Horton employees were required to sign
the MAA as a condition of employment was another critical factor the
Board cited as a reason for its decision.189 However, if employers require
employees to sign a class arbitration waiver, but give them a specified
period of time in which to “opt-out” of the agreement, then the agreement
is no longer a condition of employment.190 Employers could argue that
those who did not “opt-out” after the specified time made a truly voluntary
decision to waive their rights to class arbitration.191
PART V
CONCLUSION
As the D.R. Horton case makes its way through the appeals process,
the two critical questions that must be answered are whether the right to
pursue collective activity is a substantive right under the NLRA and
whether employment agreements requiring the simultaneous waivers of
class litigation and class arbitration must be enforced according to the
terms of those agreements.
The law is clear that arbitration agreements are contracts, and therefore,
must be enforced according to their terms.192 These principles extend to the
adjudication of employment claims, and are applicable to statutory claims,
unless the statute contains a “contrary congressional command” that claims
brought under the statute are exempt from arbitration.193
The NLRA does not contain a clear command to exempt disputes
governed by the statute from arbitration, which means it must be enforced
as a contract.194 The Board’s interpretation of the NLRA as granting
employees a substantive right to engage in concerted activity, including the
189

D.R. Horton, 2012 NLRB 11, at *3.
Labor and Employment, THE CALIFORNIA LAWYER: A DAILY JOURNAL
PUBLICATION, http://www.callawyer.com/Clstory.cfm?eid=918771 (last visited Apr. 7,
2012) (advising employers to give employees 30 days to opt out of an arbitration
agreement).
191
Id.
192
See generally In re White Mountain Mining Co., 403 F.3d 164, 169 (4th Cir.
2005) (citing 9 U.S.C. § 201); Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1 (1985); Volt Info. Srvs., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior
Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989); see also Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp.,
130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
193
CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669 (U.S. 2012) (citing
Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U. S. 220, 226 (1987)).
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See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169.
190

2014]

EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND THE FUTURE
OF CLASS-ACTION WAIVERS
29

right to pursue collective relief through litigation or arbitration is, therefore,
erroneous. Specifically, this interpretation severely conflicts with the
established judicial view that there is no substantive right to collectively
address grievances, and the right to class action is a procedural rather than
substantive right.195 Arguably, the NLRB cannot prohibit the enforcement
of a valid arbitration agreement merely because the NLRA is silent on class
arbitration. 196
There is much at stake for employers with this decision, and employers
have strong reasons for wanting the Supreme Court to decide this issue.
First, while employers may appeal to U.S. Courts of Appeals, “courts are
required to defer to the Board’s construction of the Act as long as it is
‘reasonably defensible.’” 197 Additionally, should a court decide not to
follow the Board’s decision, the Board and Administrative Law Judges will
not treat decisions by the district courts as binding precedent on disputes
governed by the NLRA and will, therefore, continue to treat the D.R.
Horton ruling as the controlling precedent until and unless the Supreme
Court deems their interpretation flawed.198
The FAA was enacted to ensure arbitration agreements were enforced as
contracts and to help avert the exuberant costs associated with litigation.199
195

Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 54 (1st Cir. 2006) (characterizing class
actions, including class arbitrations, as procedures for redressing claims); Blas v.
Belfer, 368 F.3d 501, 505 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that “there is no substantive right to
a class remedy; a class action is a procedural device”); Johnson v. West Suburban
Bank, 225 F.3d 366 (3rd Cir. 2000) (holding that the right to collectively assert a claim
for the violation of a federal statute can be waived through an arbitration agreement
since it is merely a procedural right); see also Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1443 (opining that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23, the federal rule authorizing class actions, affects only procedural rights, while “it
leaves the parties’ legal rights and duties intact”).
196
CompuCredit, 132 S. Ct. at 673 (holding that statutes that are silent on the
enforcement of arbitration agreements cannot be interpreted to prohibit the enforcement
of such agreements).
197
Daniel P. O’Gorman, Construing The National Labor Relations Act: The NLRB
And Methods of Statutory Construction, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 177, 190 (2008) (analyzing
the Board’s method of statutory construction in applying the NLRA).
198
Id.
199
See Kulukundis Shipping v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F. 2d 978 at 985
(1942)(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 96, at 1-2 (1924) (“[the report of the House Committee
[for the enactment of the FAA] stated, in part: ‘Arbitration agreements are purely
matters of contract, and the effect of the bill is simply to make the contracting party
live up to his agreement. He can no longer refuse to perform his contract when it
becomes disadvantageous to him. An arbitration agreement is placed upon the same
footing as other contracts, where it belongs.’”); see generally AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746 (2011); Volt Info. Srvs., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of
Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989) (“By permitting the courts to
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Courts have recognized cost reduction as one of the principle benefits
provided to parties through arbitration.200 Now, as the litigation costs
associated with litigating employment disputes have reached unprecedented
levels, the Board, has elected to disregard the Congressional intent to curb
litigation expenses through arbitration.201
Conceivably, an employer and employee could have an agreement that
forecloses class litigation and class arbitration in a judicial district where
the court has held that such waivers are enforceable. Since the Board is
only required to defer to Supreme Court rulings, the fact that there is
judicial precedent in this particular district would be irrelevant. Therefore,
if the employee decided to file a claim with the Board, the employer would
be forced to defend itself before an Administrative Law Judge, and likely
before the full Board. The Administrative Law Judge and the Board would
likely determine D.R. Horton controls. Only after going through this
process could the employer appeal to the district court, a potentially
favorable venue. Unfortunately, at that point, the costs savings inherent to
arbitration will have been stripped away.
Even more significant is the fact that this decision is not limited to the
NLRA. It lends considerable reach to the NLRA and essentially positions
the NLRB as the “class action enforcer” by allowing it to interpret statutes
outside of the NLRA to determine whether an employee’s right to engage
in concerted activity has been violated. This could provide an incredible
impetus for the NLRB to look into laws under the purview of other
‘rigorously enforce’ such agreements according to their terms . . . we give effect to the
contractual rights and expectations of the parties.”); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483,
490-91 (1987) (maintaining that under the FAA, courts must “rigorously” enforce
arbitration agreements according to the terms agreed to by the parties); Scherk v.
Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974); Arrants v. Buck, 130 F.3d 636, 640 (4th
Cir. 1997).
200
See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1751 (U.S. 2011)
(“Congress was fully aware that arbitration could provide procedural and cost
advantages); see also Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510-11 (1974)
(“The United States Arbitration Act . . . was designed to allow parties to avoid ‘the
costliness and delays of litigation’ and to place arbitration agreements ‘upon the same
footing as other contracts. . .’”); Prima Paint Corporation v. Flood & Conklin, 388 U.S.
395, 415 (1967).
201
Fulbright Litigation Trends: Fulbright’s 7th Annual Litigation Trends Survey
Report,
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EDUCATION,
http://www.fulbright.com/images/publications/2010AnnualLitigationTrendsSurveyFin
dingsReport.pdf; HR Tests – Recruitment, Assessment, and Personnel Selection,
http://hrtests.blogspot.com/2007/04/cost-of-defending-employment.html (last visited
Jan. 23. 2014) (As the number of suits has increased, the cost for employers to defend
an employment discrimination law suit has reached significant levels: $10,000 if the
suit is settled; $100,000 if it is resolved through summary judgment or other pre-trial
ruling; $175,000 if it goes to trial; $250,000 if the trial is won by the plaintiff(s); and
$300,000 if the plaintiff victory survives appeal).
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administrative agencies. What the NLRB has failed to realize is that the
NLRA “was not intended to be a ‘super class action statute’ that protects
and preserves the right to proceed as a class in all circumstances.”202
Hopefully, for the sake of employers, an authoritative proclamation to that
effect will be forthcoming from the Supreme Court.
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